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We develop a model of international trade in which international trade depresses real 
exchange rate volatility and exchange rate volatility impacts trade in products differently 
according to their degree of differentiation. In particular, commodities are less affected 
by exchange rate volatility than more highly differentiated products. These insights allow 
us to simultaneously identify both channels of causation, thereby structurally addressing 
one of the main shortcomings of the existing empirical literature on the effects of 
exchange rate volatility on trade - the failure to correct for reverse causality. Using 
disaggregate trade data for a large number of countries for the period 1970-1997 we find 
strong results supporting the prediction that trade dampens exchange rate volatility. We 
find that once we address the reverse-causality problem, the large effects of exchange rate 
volatility on trade found in some previous literature are greatly reduced. In particular, the 
estimated effect of currency unions on trade is reduced from 300 percent to be between 
10 and 25 percent. 
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1. Introduction 
A traditional criticism of flexible exchange rate regimes is that flexible rates 
increase the level of exchange rate uncertainty and thus reduce incentives to trade.
1 This 
criticism has generated a large literature that focuses on the impact of exchange rate 
volatility on trade. However, Mundell's (1961) optimal currency area hypothesis suggests 
an opposite direction of causality, where trade flows stabilize real exchange rate 
fluctuations, thus reducing real exchange rate volatility.
2 These two seminal ideas of 
international trade imply the existence of a standard identification problem: is the 
correlation between trade and exchange rate volatility indicative of the effect of volatility 
on trade or vice versa? 
 
    Few theoretical and empirical papers have attempted to answer this question. Most of 
the existing studies have focused on the effects of exchange rate regimes or volatility on 
trade by effectively assuming that the exchange rate process is driven by exogenous 
shocks and is unaffected by other endogenous variables.
3 Well-known examples of this 
approach for currency unions commence with Rose (2000) and include Frankel and Rose 
(2002). By definition this implies that the effect of trade on volatility is assumed 
inexistent rather than jointly estimated with the effect of volatility on trade.
4 Figure 1 
illustrates that this is not a benign assumption. This figure shows a strong positive 
relationship between real exchange rate volatility and distance between trading partners. 
                                                 
1 Taussig (1924) was an early advocate of this idea. 
2 Central banks in many developing countries have targeted real effective exchange rates in the past. This 
implies that even if trade does not act as a automatic stabilizer, policy interventions will reduce bilateral 
volatility with major trading partners. 
3 Even in the full general equilibrium models of Baccheta and van Wincoop (2001) and Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2001) exchange rate volatility is purely determined by exogenous shocks. 
4 The only exceptions are the empirical papers by Frankel and Wei (1996), Persson (2001), Tenreyro and 
Barro (2007) and Tenreyro (2007). We discuss the identification strategies of these papers in the main text. 3 
 
Since distance cannot be affected by volatility, this strong relationship suggests that 
greater distance between countries significantly increases bilateral exchange rate 
volatility through the effect of distance on the intensity of commercial relationships such 
as trade.
5 Ignoring the causal effect of trade on volatility results in overestimates of the 
true impact of exchange rate volatility on trade. 
We use a model of bilateral trade to structurally estimate the effect on trade of 
exchange rate volatility and exchange rate regimes such as fixed exchange rates and 
currency boards. The model highlights the role of trade in determining bilateral real 
exchange rate volatilities (the source of reverse causality), and the differences in the 
impact of real exchange rate volatility on trade in different types of goods. These features 
of the model constitute the main building blocks of our identification strategy. Firstly, 
real exchange rate volatility affects trade in differentiated products but does not affect 
where a commodity gets sold. Secondly, trade in all products affects real exchange rate 
volatility. These two results will enable us to identify how exchange rate volatility affects 
trade in differentiated products. The reason for this is that commodity trade can be used 
to pinpoint how trade affects exchange rate volatility. This enables identification of how 
volatility affects trade in differentiated products. Since the model predicts that 
commodity trade is only affected by relative price levels and not by volatility, we identify 
the effect of volatility on total trade. 
The intuition behind the main predictions of the model is fairly simple. First, in 
our model all trade acts as an automatic stabilizer of real exchange rates. To be consistent 
                                                 
5 This result is related to Engel and Rogers (1996) and Alesina et al. (2002), who examine the importance 
of distance in the co-movement of price shocks across cities and countries, respectively. It also relates to 
recent work by Hau (2002), discussed at pages 7-8, who finds that differences in openness can explain the 
cross-country variation in the volatility of effective real exchange rates. 4 
 
with our data, we take the real exchange rate between two countries to be the ratio of 
consumer price levels expressed in a common currency. In equilibrium, proximate 
countries have more similar consumption baskets than more distant countries. This 
implies that more proximate countries have lower real exchange rate volatility than more 
distant countries, consistent with the data presented in Figure 1. This is because a shock 
that changes the price of a country's good will affect the price of the consumption basket 
of a neighboring country more than that of a more distant country. In the limit, if baskets 
are identical, real exchange rates are constant. 
Second, in our model exchange rate volatility only affects trade in differentiated 
products. In a model with more general preferences the production mix between 
manufactures and commodities could be affected by exchange rate volatility, but 
conditional on production, where commodities get sold would remain unaffected. 
Commodity products are sold in organized exchanges. Subject to transport costs, buyers 
and sellers do not care who they buy from or sell to, what they end up paying or receiving 
is identical regardless of the counterparty. With differentiated products the same is not 
true. Rauch (1999) argues that the heterogeneity of most manufactured products in both 
characteristics and quality prevents traders from using organized exchanges for these 
products. Instead, connections between sellers and buyers are made through a costly 
search process. This cost can be associated with establishing networks, advertising, and 
marketing in general. Real-exchange rate volatility that occurs after these costs are sunk 
will affect the profitability of these connections. Therefore, in contrast to commodity 
products, trade in differentiated products is affected by exchange rate volatility.
6 
                                                 
6 The sign of the effect of volatility on trade in differentiated products depends on the degree of risk 
aversion of the firms that are exporting them. When firms are sufficiently risk averse (loving), relatively 5 
 
We use disaggregated data to exploit our identification structure and test the 
predictions of the model. Rauch (1999) provides a categorization of SITC Revision 2 
industries according to three possible product types: differentiated, reference priced, and 
commodity. The “Rauch” classification is widely used in empirical international trade 
literature. Bilateral trade data for each SITC industry is available for a large number of 
developed and developing countries during the period 1970-1997. This data is now a little 
dated, and it would be ideal if we extended it to recent years to identify the “early” effects 
of European Monetary Integration (“EMU”). We calculate several measures of bilateral 
real exchange rate volatility from monthly real exchange rate series for the same period. 
We source data on exchange rate regimes from Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose 
(2002), the IMF, Rogoff and Reinhart (2003), and Levy Yeyati and Sturzennegger (2000) 
(hereafter LYS). 
The empirical findings of this paper provide support for the view that trade 
depresses real exchange rate volatility. A trading relationship that is 1 percent of GDP 
greater than the median trade relationship implies that the volatility of the bilateral real 
exchange rate associated with the intense trading partner is 12 percent smaller than with 
the less intense partner. The empirical findings also support the view that real exchange 
rate volatility only moderately depresses exports. We find that doubling real exchange 
rate volatility decreases exports of differentiated products by 2 percent. The reduction 
from OLS estimates is because the model attributes most of the correlation between trade 
and volatility to the effect that trade has in depressing volatility. 
                                                                                                                                                 
more differentiated products will be exported to countries that have low (high) exchange rate volatilities 
with the exporting country. 6 
 
The empirical methodology is suitable for testing the effect of exchange rate 
regimes on countries' trade performances. While several studies have found large positive 
effects of fixed regimes on trade (see for example Ghosh et al. (1997) and Frankel and 
Rose (2002)) they do not control for the reverse-causality problem. However, we observe 
many fixed regimes pegging their currency to that of countries which are their main 
trading partners suggesting that reverse causality can be an important problem.
7 Indeed, 
we find that the effect of fixed regimes on trade is much smaller when the reverse 
causation is modeled. In particular, the effect of currency unions is substantially reduced 
from 300 percent to between 10 and 25 percent when we apply our methodology to 
Frankel and Rose's data, with very little loss of precision. 
This paper departs from the existing literature in several dimensions. First, this 
paper represents the first attempt to structurally estimate the relationship between trade 
and exchange rate volatility. We provide a model that incorporates both directions of 
causality and suggests an identification structure. Previous attempts to correct for the 
problem of reverse causality relied on assumptions about appropriate instruments. 
Frankel and Wei (1996) use the standard deviation of relative money supplies as an 
instrument for the volatility of exchange rates. Tenreyro and Barro (2007) and Tenreyro 
(2007) model the formation of exchange rate regimes to derive an instrument for 
volatility. They develop an instrument for membership in a currency union (or pegged 
regime) based on the probability that the countries independently adopt (or peg to) the 
same common currency. The probability that a single country adopts the currency of 
another country is a linear combination of the same "gravity" variables that affect trade 
directly. They get identification by assuming that "bilateral trade between countries i and 
                                                 
7 The European Monetary System and the Central Franc Zone are just two examples of this behavior. 7 
 
j depends on gravity variables for countries i and j, but not on gravity variables involving 
third countries, notably the potential anchors". Their IV estimates of the effect of 
currency unions on trade are substantially larger than OLS estimates, opposite to our 
results. By contrast, in the case of fixed exchange rates Tenreyro (2007) finds no effects 
of fixed exchange rates on trade, whereas we find modest but statistically significant 
effects. But their identification assumption is unusual. In most models of trade, the trade 
between countries i and j will greatly depend on the trading opportunities with third 
countries. That is an important feature of our relatively standard trade model. Persson 
(2001) also models selection into currency unions to construct control groups for 
countries "treated" with a currency union. He finds that a common currency boosts trade 
by between 13 and 65 percent, which is much closer to our estimates of 10 to 25 percent. 
His method also identifies exogenous differences in currency union status. Recent papers 
that examine the trade effects of the Euro are also relevant. The introduction of the Euro 
provides an exogenous shift (a "before" and an "after") that can be used to identify the 
effect of currency unions on trade. Early results using "gravity" regressions suggest very 
modest trade increases (see for example, Micco et al (2003). But the experiment may not 
be as clean as it appears. The introduction of the Euro was long anticipated. These papers 
will need to work hard to separate the trade effects of the common currency from the 
trade effects of other market integration measures adopted by the European Union in 
recent years. 
Second, we know of no paper that models and estimates the effect of exchange 
rate volatility on the composition of trade. In previous empirical studies, Bini-Smaghi 
(1991) and Klein (1990) have attempted to use disaggregate data to test whether 8 
 
uncertainty has different effects for different products. They find that different products 
are affected differently by volatility but the characteristics of those products that have 
larger effects are not identified. 
Third, we model how trade costs affect real exchange rate volatility. Hau (2002) 
shows theoretically and empirically that openness can affect real exchange rate volatility 
through the share of tradable goods in consumption. In his model, however, this share is 
exogenously given while in our model differences in consumption baskets are 
endogenously determined by trading and searching costs. In our model the bilateral 
pattern of real exchange rate volatility can differ across countries even though the 
underlying shocks to each country are identical. This different approach has very real 
identification implications. Hau (2002) recognizes that openness is an endogenous 
variable and may be affected by exchange rate volatility. He follows Romer (1993) and 
uses land area as a “suitable” instrument for openness in his regressions. In our model we 
can see why land area is related to openness – it affects individual product prices through 
trade costs and aggregate price indexes through market size. Trade costs and aggregate 
price indexes belong in our equation system, suggesting that land area may not be 
suitable as an instrument. 
Lastly, the focus of most of the theoretical literature is on the role that the 
invoicing currency plays because prices are set before the exchange rate is observed. 
Therefore, the invoicing currency determines who bears the exchange rate risk. Note that 
in this setup uncertainty arises between the time in which prices are set and the time final 
payment is made, which is usually a short period.
8 We depart from this tradition and 
                                                 
8 Informal evidence suggests that this can take between one and six months. 9 
 
focus on the market entry decision of exporting firms. There are no price rigidities in this 
model. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains our trade model. Section 3 
discusses the implications of that model for exchange rate volatility. Section 4 develops 
our empirical model and identification strategy. Section 5 describes our data. Section 6 
presents the main results of the paper and the comparisons with the exchange rate regime 
literature. Section 7 presents robustness checks. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. A 4-country, 2-sector Trade Model 
A. Model Description 
The model has four countries and two sectors, manufacturing and commodities. 
The manufacturing sector is an adaptation of the Krugman (1980) model of intraindustry 
trade driven by scale economies and product differentiation. The adaptation is that to 
serve an export market manufacturers must incur an additional fixed cost in each period 
before observing that period's exchange rates. After making the entry decision and 
observing the exchange rate, the manufacturer can set prices optimally for that period. 
Manufacturers' assumptions about the distribution of exchange rates will affect the entry 
decision. Exchange rates are affected by productivity shocks that are external to this 
model. Commodity producers do not face a fixed cost of entry, they are always ready to 
sell in a market. The realized price levels affect where commodities are sent; exchange 
rate volatility has no independent effect on commodity trade. Finally we add `iceberg' 
transport costs. The transport costs affect the distribution of exchange rates and affect 
manufacturers' decisions to export. Detailed assumptions are set out below. 10 
 
1. There are 4 countries i = 1,..,4 on 2 continents; Country 1 and 2 on one 
continent and 3 and 4 on the other. 
2. Each country has its own currency that can be freely exchanged for that of 
another. The price of Country i's currency in terms of the currency of Country 1, which 
we call the dollar, is si. 
3. There is one factor of production, Labor, supplied inelastically. Labor earns a 
factor reward of wi = 1 unit of local currency. The total labor supply in each country is 1. 
4. Trade is always balanced. It is essential to have some long-run trade balance 
condition, though it need not take this simple and extreme form. Since the model is used 
to motivate an empirical specification we do not see this as an important limitation. We 
will not be estimating “deep” parameters of our model. 
5. Exchange rate movements are driven by shocks to labor productivity 
θi⁻¹∈(0,1). Any exogenous cause of real exchange rate movements would suffice for our 
purposes. 
6. All consumers in all countries are assumed to maximize identical constant-
relative-risk-aversion preferences in each period over a composite manufactured good M 
and a composite commodity C, with the fraction of income spent on M being b (Equation 
1). 
()
1 1 a bb UM C
a
- =        ( 1 )  
     
7. Commodity sector. The commodity C is a composite good. Perfectly 
competitive firms in Country i produce an identical commodity under constant returns to 
scale, requiring θi  units of labor to produce 1 unit of the commodity. Each country 11 
 
produces a different commodity. For instance, Country 1 might produce wheat while 
Country 2 produces copper. What is essential for our model is that some commodities are 
internationally traded between some countries. C  can be interpreted as a sub-utility 
function that depends on the quantity of each commodity consumed. We choose the CES 
function with elasticity of substitution between two different commodities being σc. Let 
qi
D denote the quantity consumed of the commodity produced in Country i. C is defined 
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8. Monopolistic competition in manufacturing. In manufacturing there are 
economies of scale in production and firms can costlessly differentiate their products. 
The output of manufacturing consists of a number of varieties that are imperfect 
substitutes for one another. The quantity produced of variety v is denoted by qv
S, the 
quantity consumed by qv
D. V is the endogenously determined set of varieties produced. M 
can be interpreted as a sub-utility function that depends on the quantity of each variety of 
M consumed. We choose the symmetric CES function with elasticity of substitution 
σm>1: 
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All manufacturers must serve their domestic market. Manufactures are produced 
using labor with a marginal cost wiθi and a per-period fixed cost. The fixed cost must be 12 
 
paid before manufacturers observe the exchange rates for the period. Average costs of 
production decline at all levels of output, although at a decreasing rate. Production 
technology for a firm in Country e selling qv units in the domestic market is represented 
by a total cost function TC that is assumed to be identical for all firms selling in their 
domestic market: 
() ( ) 1
SS
ev e v e TC q w q aq = +       ( 4 )          
    Manufacturers enter foreign markets through exports only.
9 To export to a foreign 
market, the manufacturer must incur a per-period fixed cost for market development, 
which must be paid before observing exchange rates for that period.
10 The manufacturer's 
cost for market development and producing xv units for export from country e (exporter) 
to country i (importer) is represented by the Free On Board (FOB) export cost function 
XC: 
   () () 2
sS
ei v e v e XC x w x aq = +       ( 5 )  
9. Costly international trade. There may be a transport cost for international trade. 
To avoid the need to model a separate transport sector, transport costs are introduced in 
the convenient but special iceberg form. τ1m units of a manufactured good must be 
shipped for 1 unit to arrive in the country on the same continent, τ2m units must be 
shipped for 1 unit to arrive in a country on a different continent (τ2m ≥ τ1m ≥ 1). The 
equivalent transport costs for commodities are τ1c and τ2c. 
    B. Equilibrium in Commodity Sectors 
                                                 
9 If they produce in a foreign country, their cost structure is identical to a domestic firm's.  
10 The critical assumption is not the fixed cost α₁ for commencing domestic production, but how large the 
fixed cost α₂ for entering each export market is relative to α₁. 13 
 
    In general equilibrium consumers maximize utility, firms maximize profits, all factors 
are fully employed and trade is balanced. Productivity determines exchange rates se. The 
equilibrium for commodity sectors is straightforward. Firms always price at marginal 
cost. For their domestic market, marginal cost in local currency is simply equal to the 
wage rate, 1. For export markets marginal cost is higher due to the transport cost. The 
price, in dollars, of a commodity produced in country e (exporter) and sold in country i 
(importer) is given by Equation 6: 
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Consumers spend a fixed proportion of their income on commodities. They 
demand some of each commodity. Income in Country i in dollars is simply si. 
Maximizing Equation 1 yields the following demand functions in Country i for 
commodities produced in e: 






















      ( 7 )  
where  τeic = 1, τic, or τ2c, according to Model Assumption 9. Note how trade costs 
involving third countries e′ directly affect the trade between e and i. It is convenient to 
define the ideal price index for commodities in Country i, Pic: 
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Equations 6 through 8 can be solved for log of the value of commodity exports 
from Country e to Country i: 14 
 
() () ()() ln 1 ln 1 ln ln 1 1 ln
D
ei ei c e e c eic i c ic p qs b s P sq s t s =- +- + - --  (9) 
We can eliminate Country i specific effects such as its commodity price index Pic 
and income spent on commodities (1-b)si by differencing. In particular, the log value of 
Country i's imports of commodities from Country e, lnCei less the log value of Country i's 
imports of commodities from Country e′ is: 
() ( ) () ( ) '' '' ln ln 1 ln ln 1 ln ln ei e i c e e e e c eic e ic CC s s sq q s tt -= - - + - -  (10)   
C. Equilibrium in Manufacturing Sectors 
The equilibrium in manufacturing sectors is more involved. The crucial difference is that 
some manufacturers may not end up exporting to some or all foreign markets, and that 
this proportion will depend on the perceived volatility of exchange rates. The properties 
of the model's demand structure for manufactures have been analyzed in Helpman and 
Krugman (1985).
11 Let pei,v be the price paid by consumers in country i, inclusive of 
transport costs, for a variety v produced in country e, expressed in dollars. Maximization 
of Equation 1 yields the following demand functions for variety v in country i: 
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A firm's share of industry revenues depends on its own price and on the prices set 
by all other firms in that industry. It is convenient to define the ideal price index for 
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11 See Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 10.4 in particular. 15 
 
Each firm produces a different variety of the product. Each country produces 
different varieties. Consumers demand some of every variety made available to them. 
Profit maximizing firms perceive a demand curve that has a constant elasticity, and 
therefore set price at a constant markup over marginal cost.
12 An individual firm in 
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For export markets marginal cost is higher due to the transport cost. The 
consumer price pei,v, in dollars, of a manufactured good v produced in country e and sold 
in country i is given by Equation 14: 
  ,, ˆ ei v ei v eim pp t =        ( 1 4 )  
Country e's products sell in its own domestic market at the factory gate price  , ˆev p , 
but in export markets the transport cost raises the price to  , ˆei v eim pt . The ideal 
manufacturing industry price index for Country i, Pim, is given in Equation 15. We 
assume a symmetric equilibrium if each country faces the same distribution of shocks to 
productivity, which affect exchange rates. Prior to the realization of the productivity 
shock, all countries are alike with n firms manufacturing in each country, and that nfei 
manufacturing firms from Country e export to Country i. Let fei = f₁ if e and i are on the 
same continent, and fei = f₂ if e and i are on different continents. Note that fei = 1 if e = i 
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12 The demand curve faced by a firm has a constant elasticity if there are an infinite number of varieties. 16 
 
Equation 16 gives real profits for sales in Country i for a manufacturer based in 
Country e:  1
m s  is the profit margin; αise is the fixed market development cost in dollars, 
where αi = α₁ if  e = i (domestic sales) and αi = α₂ if e ≠ i (export sales); the remainder 
of the term in brackets are sales revenues in dollars; while Pe = (Pem)
b(Pec)
1-b is the ideal 
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With free entry, manufacturers establish themselves in each Country e and make 
decisions to export to each other country i until for each manufacturer: 
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    where Iei is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a manufacturer exports from 
e to i and is 0 otherwise, and a is the parameter governing risk aversion. Profitability in 
each market is a declining function of the number of domestic firms n and the number of 
foreign firms n(f₁+2f₂) that export to that market, since the price index Pim declines with 
entry and because σm > 1. In general, the proportion of manufacturers that export to 
nearby markets, f₁, and the proportion f₂ that export to distant markets will depend on 
transport costs, market entry costs, risk aversion, and the distribution of exchange rates. 
f₂ will in general differ from f₁ directly due to the higher transport cost (which reduces 
willingness to enter) and indirectly through the impact of transport costs on the 
distribution of exchange rates. 17 
 
    f₁ and f₂ are therefore different functions of expected exchange rate volatility. The first 
two equations of our empirical specification will come directly from Equations 10 and 
19, recognizing that f₁ and f₂ are a function of exchange rate volatility. Let Ve be the set 
of all manufacturing varieties produced in Country e. Equations 11 through 15 solve for 
the log of the value of manufacturing imports into Country i from Country e: 
() () () ln ln 1 ln 1 ln ln 1 ln
e
D
eiv eiv ei m e e m eim i m im
vV
p qn f s b s P sq s t s
Î
=+ - + - + - - ò    (18) 
We again employ differencing to eliminate Country i specific effects. Equation 19 
gives the log value of Country i's manufacturing imports from Country e, lnMei, less the 
log value of Country i's manufacturing imports from Country e′: 
() ()
'' ' ' '
ln ln 1 ln 1 ln
ei ei e e eim
mm
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Equation 19 for manufacturing trade depends on the difference in the proportions fei and 
fe’i of manufacturers who choose to pay the fixed cost to enter Country i's market, which 
will depend on the distribution of exchange rates and attitudes to risk.  
 
3. Endogenous Exchange Rate Volatility 
In most of the existing theoretical literature the exchange rate process is purely 
driven by exogenous shocks. The earlier literature relied on a partial equilibrium 
approach in which the exchange rate was assumed to be an exogenous random variable: 
see Ethier (1973), Viane and Vries (1992) and Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978). More 
recently, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) and Baccheta and van Wincoop (2000) have 
focused on general equilibrium models of exchange rate fluctuations. They highlight the 18 
 
importance of having fundamentals, such as monetary, fiscal and productivity shocks, 
drive exchange rate fluctuations. However, in these models, real exchange rates are 
unaffected by other endogenous variables, and are purely driven by exogenous shocks. 
In our model trade acts as an automatic stabilizer of real exchange rates. The 
model implies that in equilibrium proximate countries have more similar consumption 
baskets than more distant countries. More similar consumption baskets, in turn, reduce 
real exchange rate volatility. The intuition for this result is simple. Since real exchange 
rates are commonly measured as the ratio of price levels Pi across countries (denominated 
in a common currency), a shock to the price of one country's output shifts the relative 
price level between itself and more proximate countries less than it shifts the relative 
price levels between itself and more distant countries. Hau (2002) obtains a similar cross-
country prediction using a small open economy model by assuming that the share of 
tradable goods in preferences vary by country. Our model differs from his in two 
dimensions. First, Hau assumes different consumption baskets across countries, while in 
our setup they are endogenously determined by trading and searching costs. Second, in 
our multi-country framework the bilateral pattern of real exchange rate volatility can 
differ across countries even though the distribution of underlying shocks to each country 
are identical. Thirdly, we argue that his instrument for openness, land area, is effectively 
a proxy for variables that belong directly in the system of equations such as trade costs 
and aggregate price indexes, and is therefore not a valid instrument. 
Figure 2 illustrates the impact that trade costs have on real exchange rate volatility 
in the model. In particular, it shows the relationship between inter-continental trading 
costs and the relative real exchange rate volatility between countries that share the same 19 
 
continent and between countries on different continents. We assume that the distribution 
of productivity shocks hitting each individual country are identical; σm = σc = 5; intra-
continental trading costs τ1m = τ1c = 1; inter-continental trading costs are τ2m = τ2c = τ2; 
firms are risk neutral; and the fixed cost of entering foreign markets is sufficiently low 
that manufacturers export to all markets. The figure shows that with τ2 > 1, real exchange 
rate volatility with distant countries is larger than with proximate countries. It also shows 
that when the trading costs between continents increase, the inter-continental bilateral 
real exchange rate volatility rises relative to the intra-continental volatility. For the 
empirical section that follows, this means that we face a system of simultaneous 
equations. OLS regressions of trade on exchange rate volatility will be biased towards 
finding depressing effects of real exchange rate volatility on trade, because trade itself 
depresses real exchange rate volatility. 
But what does this other equation look like? Suppose that productivity in country 
e rises. At pre-existing exchange rates there is an incipient trade surplus in country e. 
Every country's demand shifts toward country e's output because the prices of country e's 
products falls. Country e's exchange rate appreciates. How much it appreciates is 
negatively related to how substitutable country e's output is for the output of other 
countries, which is determined by σc and σm. But what happens to real exchange rates? In 
the Appendix it is shown that the sensitivity of country i's real exchange rate with country 
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where Mei (Cei)is the dollar value of manufactures (commodities) produced in country e 
and consumed in country i. The terms on the right of Equation 20 are simply the dollar 
value of country e's goods sold in countries i and e respectively divided by aggregate 
income in those countries. How much the real exchange rate moves depends on the 
difference in the importance of country e's goods in country i's and country e's 
consumption baskets. The more that country e exports to country i, the more similar their 
consumption baskets will look. This is consistent with Figures 2 and 3; the less trade 
there is between countries, the greater the volatility of their real exchange rate. Trade in 
both manufactures and commodities is important. Without a closed-form solution, we 
assume that the way that exports from e to i affect bilateral real exchange rate volatility 
between e and i is given by: 
  ln ln ln
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4. Empirical Model 
We base our empirical specification in Equations 10, 19 and 21. In order to better 
assess the identification structure suggested by the model, we first present this system of 
equations in its most general format. We include importer-exporter and time fixed effects 
to account for the direct effect of bilateral trade costs, and model the proportion of 
manufacturers that export to foreign markets, fei, as a simple linear function of expected 
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The first identification assumption suggested by the model in the previous section is that 
α
c = 0. This assumption suggests that commodity trade is unaffected by exchange rate 
volatility. Producers of commodity products are always ready to export their product, 
only today's price levels matter for how much they export. This assumption is not testable 
as our model is exactly identified. The second identification assumption, implicit in 
Equation 24, suggests that the impact of trade on exchange rate volatility is the same 
regardless of the product being traded (we relax this assumption later as a robustness 




v) = 0. 
These four assumptions allow us to identify the coefficients of interest, (α
m, β) without 
making any assumption about E(ɛ
mɛ
c). We estimate the system using GMM, imposing 
these restrictions. Commodity trade is in effect being used as an instrument for the 
function of trade in Equation 24; the only way commodity trade affects real exchange rate 
volatility is through its effect in making consumption bundles more similar. With 
Equation 24 identified, GMM uses the estimated residual  ' ee it e $  as an instrument for 
ln(Veit/Ve’it) in Equation 22. This residual is a shock to real exchange rate volatility that 
is not caused by trade. 22 
 
This system is general enough to understand the biases introduced by other 
identifying procedures. In particular, estimating Equation 22 ignoring the existence of 
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where  ' eit e it dV V V  and  eit V  is the real exchange rate volatility variable purged of the 
fixed effects and exogenous variables. In the case where β < 0 and α < 0, then |α| > |α| 
which implies that the estimate of the effect of trade on exchange rate volatility 
overestimates the true effect when the reverse causality channel is assumed away. If in 
addition the econometrician is lax in controlling for bilateral trade costs, it can easily be 
shown that the simultaneity bias gets exacerbated by omitted variables bias, because 
these trade costs depress trade and the omitted costs will be positively correlated with real 
exchange rate volatility. In this situation, adding additional proxies for trade costs may 
reduce the omitted variables bias, but may have no effect on the simultaneity bias. We 
argue that this is precisely what is happening in Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose 
(2002). Note how in Frankel and Rose (2002) the estimated impact of currency unions 
declines as they better control for a broad conception of trade costs. Better controlling for 
trade costs is necessary to reduce omitted variable bias but does nothing to address 
simultaneity bias. Hau (2002)’s instrument for openness, land area, is a proxy for trade 
cost and price index variables that belong in the system, hence land area will be 
correlated with the error term in his regression. 
We adapt the model to estimate the relationship between exchange rate regimes 
and trade. The underlying idea is very similar to the exchange rate volatility case. 
Countries are more likely to bind their exchange rate to that of their major trading 23 
 
partners, which may have the effect of promoting trade between those countries. We use 
the methodology described above to identify how trade affects the exchange rate regime 
and how that exchange rate regime affects trade. In this case lnVeit is replaced by a simple 
indicator variable indicating the presence of a currency union or a currency board (CUei), 
or a fixed exchange rate (Feit). This adaptation is open to the criticism that if the monetary 
authority is interested in promoting trade and realizes that volatility has no impact on 
commodity trade, it may seek to peg the exchange rate with large manufacturing-trade 
partners. This criticism can be addressed by reducing the weight given to commodity 
trade in equation (24). 
 
5. Trade and Real Exchange Rate Data. 
Rauch (1999) provides a categorization of SITC Revision 2 industries according 
to three possible product types following an extensive search for published “reference” 
prices: differentiated, reference priced, and commodity. The “Rauch” classification is 
widely used in empirical international trade studies, but has not been updated to cover 
more recent trade classifications. The lack of a reference price distinguishes 
"differentiated" products from the rest. Those industries with reference prices can be 
further divided into those whose reference prices are quoted on organized exchanges 
("commodities") and those whose reference prices are quoted only in trade publications 
("reference priced"). The classification is fixed, products do not migrate from one 
classification to the other. Most elaborate manufactures usually belong to fairly broad 
SITC classifications and get classified as differentiated products even if they are 
effectively reference priced (example: computer memory chips). The trade data consists 24 
 
of annual flows of exports from a given country to different importing countries. For 
instance, Lead (SITC 685) is listed on an organized exchange and therefore treated as a 
commodity while Footwear (SITC 851) is not and is treated as a differentiated product. 
Bilateral trade data for each SITC industry is available for a large number of developed 
and developing countries during the period 1970-1997. The data consists of annual flows 
of exports from a given country to different importing countries. Table A1 shows the 
share of each type of product for different regions and time periods. A summary of the 
sample used in the estimation is listed in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
    Another  essential  part  of  the  estimation is to obtain a measure of exchange rate 
volatility. We use monthly data on real exchange rate series from IFS to compute 
standard deviations. We de-trend these series using a Hodrick-Prescott filter and take 
standard deviations of the filtered data in five year periods.
13 Table A1 also shows the 
descriptive statistics of these series. The additional data needed for the main 
specifications are taken from the World Development Indicators, except for export prices 
seθe, which are computed using detailed unit export price data in US trade statistics 
described in Feenstra et al. (1997 and 2002) after extracting product-by-year fixed 
effects. 
We source data on currency unions and currency boards from Frankel and Rose 
(2002). The paper also uses data on other fixed exchange rate regimes. The basic 
reference for classification of exchange rate regimes is the International Monetary Fund's 
                                                 
13 We identify the trend from the monthly log real exchange rate data using a smoothing parameter of 
1,000,000. Our volatility measure is the standard deviation of the detrended series over the previous 5 
years. For robustness checks, the detrended series is further decomposed into short-term volatility and 
medium-term volatility, by smoothing these deviations using a smoothing parameter of 400. 25 
 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
14 
This classification is a de jure classification that is based on the publicly stated 
commitment of the authorities in the country in question. The IMF report captures the 
notion of a formal commitment to a regime, but fails to capture whether the actual 
policies were consistent with the stated commitment. Since we mainly use bilateral data 
in the paper, we use the currency to which a country is pegged to create a fixed exchange 
rate regime dummy that takes the value of one if one country's currency is pegged to the 
other country's currency or if two countries are pegged to the same currency. While a de 
jure classification like the IMF's captures the formal commitment to a regime it fails to 
capture whether the actual policies were consistent with this commitment. For instance, 
de jure pegs can pursue policies inconsistent with their stated regime and require frequent 
changes in the nominal exchange rate, making the degree of commitment embedded in 
the peg in fact similar to a float. The problems that arise from a pure de jure classification 
have prompted researchers to use different criteria to classify regimes. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2002) classify exchange rate regimes using information about the existence of 
parallel markets combined with the actual exchange rate behavior in those markets. Levy 
Yeyati and Sturzennegger (2000) analyze data on volatility of reserves and actual 
exchange rates. A similar bilateral fixed exchange rate dummy is constructed from 
Reinhart and Rogoff and Levy Yeyati and Sturzennegger database. We source data on 
currency unions and currency boards from Rose (2000) and Frankel and Rose (2002). 
 
6. Results 
                                                 
14 The AREAER classification consists of nine categories, broadly grouped into pegs, arrangements with 
limited flexibility, and "more flexible arrangements", which include managed and pure floats. This 
description is based on the AREAER (1996). 26 
 
The main results of the paper are reported in Tables 1-3. Table 1's first two 
columns presents OLS estimates of Equations 22 and 24. A 10 percent increase in 
volatility depresses differentiated product trade by 0.7 percent, while a 10 percent 
increase in trade reduces exchange rate volatility by 0.3 percent. The next two columns 
present GMM estimates of Equations 22 and 24. The OLS estimate of the effect of 
volatility on trade is reduced by 70 percent. This reduction is because the model attributes 
much of the correlation between trade and volatility to the effect that trade has in 
depressing volatility. A 10 percent increase in the intensity of a bilateral trading 
relationship reduces the volatility of the associated exchange rate by 0.3 percent. 
Although the estimate is statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect does not at 
first appear to be that large. But it must be remembered that the typical bilateral trading 
relationship is very small (the median was under $8 million in 1997, whereas the median 
GDP was $32 billion), while the typical real exchange rate is quite volatile (typically 11 
percent from its trend). A trading relationship that is 1 percent of GDP greater than the 
median trade relationship implies that the volatility of the bilateral real exchange rate 
associated with the intense trading partner is 12 percent smaller than with the less intense 
partner. Though most trade relationships are much smaller than this, intense relationships 
of this size or greater are very numerous, especially between proximate countries. For 
example, the Canada-US trade relationship in 1997 is equal to 23 percent of GDP using 
our measure: US exports to Canada equal 21 percent of Canada’s GDP while Canadian 
exports to the US equal 2 percent of US GDP. Our results predict that this intense 
relationship reduces the volatility of the USD-CAD real exchange rate by 38 percent 
compared with the typical exchange-rate pair. The estimated effect of trade on exchange 27 
 
rate volatility in Table 1, columns 5-8 is barely changed by the addition of more 
explanatory variables that often appear in "gravity" models of trade, though the estimated 
effect of volatility on trade declines. 
Table 2 presents estimates from the adaptation of our identification strategy to 
estimating the effect of currency unions and currency boards on trade. In our sample 
there are very few instances of a change in currency union or currency board status, so 
we drop the fixed effects for each importer-exporter relationship and instead include 
exporter fixed effects and importer fixed effects. Extension of the data to more recent 
years would be helpful here due to EMU. The OLS result is again presented in column 1, 
with the typically large estimate that a currency union increases trade by 250 percent, 
consistent with Rose (2000), Frankel and Rose (2002), and Glick and Rose (2002). 
Columns 2-3 present the GMM estimates. We find that controlling for reverse causality 
reduces the estimate of the currency union effect to 25 percent; the estimate is one tenth 
the size of the OLS estimate and just as precise. Almost all of the correlation between 
trade and the presence of a currency union or a currency board is attributed to the fact 
that countries are much more likely to adopt the exchange rate of a major trading partner. 
The addition of explanatory variables that are often used to explain trade in the presence 
of currency unions does not change the basic story. The OLS estimates are always above 
50 percent, the GMM estimates are always small, ranging between 10 and 25 percent, 
with very little loss in precision relative to their OLS counterparts. The OLS estimates are 
usually outside 95 percent confidence intervals for the GMM estimates. 
Table 3 presents estimates from the adaptation of our identification strategy to 
estimating the effect of fixed exchange rates on trade. The fact that many countries have 28 
 
changed their exchange rate regime allows us to reintroduce fixed effects for every 
importer-exporter relationship. The coefficient on the fixed exchange rate variable is only 
identified because countries have changed their exchange rate regime. All estimates, be 
they OLS or GMM suggest only modest effects of fixed exchange rates on trade. The 
GMM estimates for the two de facto measures of exchange rate regime both suggest that 
a fixed exchange rate regime increases differentiated product trade by 6 percent. 
 
Robustness Checks 
We check the robustness of our results to a number of changes to our empirical 
model. Table 4 reports sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of exchange rate 
volatility. We construct four measures to capture volatility at different frequencies by 
adjusting the smoothing parameters used in the Hodrick-Prescott filters. The data is 
filtered to isolate very low-frequency movements that we term "long-run" volatility, very 
high-frequency movements that we term "short-run" volatility, and all-other movements 
that we term "medium-run" volatility. The estimates based on short-run volatility are 
higher than the other estimates. Trade is both more sensitive to short-run volatility and 
has a greater effect in dampening short-run volatility. 
Table 5 performs our basic regression for different regions. In particular we are 
interested if our results depend on whether the exporting country is developed or 
developing. All of the depressing effect of volatility on trade comes from developing 
country exporters. Developed country exporters are not adversely affected by exchange 
rate volatility. This suggests that developing country exporters are more risk-averse or are 29 
 
less able to hedge the real-exchange rate risk. For both groups of exporters, trade 
depresses the volatility of the exchange rate. 
Table 6 reports the effect of adding information on capital controls and capital 
flows to each equation. Gross private capital flows sourced from the World Development 
Indicators is the sum of gross private capital flows as a percentage of GDP for the 
exporting and the importing country. Capital control data sourced from the IMF's 
AREAER is the sum of the dummy variables indicating the presence or absence of capital 
controls in the exporting and importing countries. The results barely change. 
Figures 4 to 7 illustrate the effect of reducing the relative effect of commodity 
trade in reducing real exchange rate volatility or in affecting the likelihood of entering 
into a currency union. This is done by introducing a parameter βc to equation (21) 
describing how trade affects volatility and the equivalent equations describing the 
formation of exchange rate regimes: 
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This new parameter has to be imposed since the model is otherwise unidentified. As this 
parameter is reduced from the value of 1 used in all prior regressions, the model attributes 
even more of the correlation between trade and volatility or currency union to the effect 
that trade has in depressing volatility or leading to a currency union. Exchange rate 
volatility and currency unions appear to have little impact on trade. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Most of the studies of the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade assume that 
the volume of trade has no impact on exchange rate volatility, thus assuming away an 30 
 
endogeneity problem. We present evidence that this problem is severe. We develop a 
model in which both directions of causality are considered and that allows us to 
structurally identify the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade. We exploit our 
identification structure by using disaggregate product trade data for a large number of 
countries for the period 1970-1997. We find that deeper bilateral trading relations 
dampen real exchange rate volatility and are much more likely to lead to a currency 
union. In fact, our empirical model attributes most of the correlation between trade and 
volatility to the effect that trade has in depressing volatility. It is this effect that had been 
assumed away in the previous literature. The paper finds some evidence that real 
exchange rate volatility depresses trade in differentiated goods. The size of the effect is 
fairly small and unevenly distributed. A doubling of real exchange rate volatility 
decreases trade in differentiated products by about 2 percent. Developing country exports 
of manufactures may be much more greatly affected due to a combination of greater 
exchange rate volatility and greater sensitivity of their exporters to that volatility. We find 
that controlling for reverse causality, the estimates of the effect of currency unions on 
trade are much smaller than OLS estimates and similarly precise. Currency unions 





    Derivation of equation 20. The log of the price index for country i is: 
   
    ln ln 1 ln ii m i c Pb P bP          ( 2 7 )  
 
where Pim is defined in equation 15 and Pic is defined in equation 8. Differentiating: 
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The first term on the right side of equation 30 is the proportion of Country i's income 
spent on manufactured goods produced in Country e, while the second term is the 
proportion spent on commodities from Country e. For small shocks to se, the price index 
in country i changes in line with the share of country e's goods in Country i's 
consumption basket. Equation 20 follows from our definition of the real exchange rate as 
the ratio of two price indexes. 
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